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Shuford: President’s Forum

PRESIDENT’S FORUM

The Naval War College’s Twin Missions

plays two coequal roles in preparing the
Navy for the challenges of the twenty-first century: educating future leaders and helping to define naval forces and operational concepts through
research, analysis, and war gaming.
Although for simplicity I have said the College has two distinct missions, in
reality classroom instruction and research, analysis, and war gaming are thoroughly intertwined. In order to graduate, all of our students must participate in
at least one large, multiweek war game planned by our Joint Military Operations
Department and executed by our War Gaming Department. An increasing
number of our top students, now around 25 percent, are involved with focused
research, analysis, and war-gaming projects.
Each of the two missions for the Naval War College, education and research,
is critical to the other: We cannot achieve our educational objective without
research, analysis, and gaming capabilities, nor can we achieve our research objectives for the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) and our fleet commanders
without our teaching faculty and students.
The complementary relationship of education and research functions is in
the process of becoming deeper, stronger, and more necessary to the College as
we revise our educational curricula.
THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE

• First, we are developing from the ground up an intermediate-level command
and staff course of instruction, graduates of which will be Joint Professional
Military Education Phase I (JPME I) certified. But more importantly, these
officers will be critical thinkers with an operational perspective, planners
who are capable of applying operational art in maritime, joint, interagency,
and multinational environments and skilled in the joint planning process.
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They will excel in operational billets on our numbered fleet, joint,
interagency, or multinational staffs.

• Second, we are restructuring and elevating our senior-level professional
military education program, graduates of which will, for the first time ever
at the Naval War College, meet the Joint Chiefs’ requirements for JPME
Phase II. (JPME I and II certification are required by law for promotion to
flag rank.) This curriculum will focus on preparing officers for assignment
to key and essential positions on service, joint, interagency, and multinational
organizations and on developing competencies necessary at the highest
levels of leadership in our nation. Our graduates from the senior course are
expected to serve immediately as trusted, sought-after advisers to civilian
policy makers or senior military commanders and to contribute directly to
the strategic, operational, and resource-planning processes that will shape
the future of our nation’s security.

• Third, we are establishing a short course for flag officers to develop
competencies required to serve as a Joint Force Maritime Component
Commander (JFMCC), the maritime command and control element of the
joint force. (This course will stand up this August.) Each of these new
courses depends heavily on our faculty, researchers, and war gamers,
working together as a tightly coordinated team.
Dialogue with Leadership
I just returned from a ten-day series of visits to Washington, D.C.; Millington,
Tennessee (with all our detailers); San Diego; and Hawaii. I visited all of our
West Coast type commanders, Commander Third Fleet, and Commander Pacific Fleet. The purpose of the trip was twofold. The first objective was to continue the dialogue with Navy leadership on the range of issues associated with
the implementation of a bona fide continuum of professional military education. (As of 2 March 2005, the Naval War College is responsible for establishing
the curricula and course content for professional military education for pay
grades E1 to O8.) The second objective of the trip was to provide results of ongoing analysis vital to the missions of our operational commanders.
The Navy’s head detailer, “Pers 4,” accompanied me on this trip to help accomplish my first objective. As head of the office responsible for all enlisted and
officer personnel (except flag officers) assignments and for the establishment
and management of career development tracks with the Navy’s various communities and its manpower policy apparatus, his presence was invaluable. The implications for career development associated with the initiatives outlined in our
last “President’s Forum”—with the implementation of the continuum—are
many and significant for our Navy. We will continue this dialogue to ensure that
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the College moves forward, with the full support of the Navy’s senior leadership,
and plays a lead role in the development of the Navy’s emerging Human Capital
Strategy. Our engagement thus far has been encouraging without exception,
particularly as we focus the traditional (and in many cases unique) strengths of
the College on those war-fighting and leadership competencies most in demand
at the operational and strategic levels of leadership across our armed services.
Also traveling with me were several students currently engaged in one of our
Halsey directed-research groups. The recently instituted Halsey Program is focused on quantitative analysis of critical war-fighting challenges facing our operational commanders in their specific theaters. We have stood up different Halsey
groups to conduct rigorous research, analysis, and war gaming in the areas of
antisubmarine warfare (ASW), maritime air and missile defense, and sea basing.
(The logic of these three focus areas becomes clear as one recognizes that sea basing is the distinguishing element of naval forces, and that success against the undersea and air threats enables the Navy’s unique contribution to joint warfare.)
The research and analysis being produced and briefed to the highest levels of
our service and joint leadership is rapidly gaining a reputation for credibility
and relevance. CNO has noted that “once again the Naval War College is at the
center of operational thinking in the Navy.” Comments from the Navy’s ASW
Task Force commander that the ASW work being done by Halsey II is “the most
useful analysis” he has seen in the ASW mission area typify the feedback we are
getting as we brief-out to the fleet. These results should not be surprising.
The last two years have seen a major shift in distribution of the Navy’s most
promising line officers into our College. These officers bring not only a fresh operational perspective but also an expectation to move forward through the ranks
to the highest levels of responsibility. The Halsey Program selects the most
prominent and brings them into a cadre of world-class researchers and warfare
analysts in our Center for Naval Warfare Studies. While the expert cadre remains
in place and continues to advance our understanding of particular elements of war
fighting, the students actually conduct the analysis, using the cutting-edge
war-gaming techniques and facilities the College is famous for.
Payoff for the Fleet
The payoff is huge. First, our students achieve key academic objectives while, second, developing a comprehensive and profound understanding of real threats,
capabilities, and the key tactical- and operational-level issues they will face in
follow-on command and staff assignments. Finally, third, each Halsey group
yields analysis directly related to war-fighting challenges in a specific theater of
operations. This process discovers and highlights those tactical imperatives
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or capabilities that are potentially linchpins of operational-level courses of action, themselves linked to our national strategic options.
Another set of students—our Mahan Scholars—works at the strategic level.
Linking the operational and strategic analyses of the Halsey and Mahan efforts
forces a detailed examination of how military conditions established by a
commander relate to—and inform—the selection of military strategy and its
political ends. With its career-focused, highly motivated, joint/interagency/
multinational student body and its world-leading war-gaming and analysis capability, the Naval War College is in a unique position to do this type of comprehensive work.
The College is bringing this unique capability into battery to directly support
our fleet commanders not only through the operational analysis driven by our
Halsey groups but also through political-military expertise resident in our Strategic Research Department and through war gaming performed by both the War
Gaming and Warfare Analysis and Research Departments. The most recent
example of this is the College’s support of the highly impactful Fifth Fleet “strategic review.”
With a wider aperture, the research arm of the Naval War College is also exploring a potentially significant role in an area of increasing importance to the
Navy—both national and theater missile defense. The prospect of conducting
missile defense at sea to defend the U.S. homeland, American allies, and U.S. surface ships poses a remarkably complex array of challenges to the Navy and our
regional commanders. How will we apportion and employ our capabilities to
balance the national and theater missions? How are multimission-capable surface ships best used to conduct these missions? How are these platforms best defended, since, presumably, adversaries will assign a high priority to eliminating
them? These are just a few of the questions that must be answered as the sea-based
capabilities for missile defense continue to evolve against a very real threat.
The Global War on Terror (GWOT) and the Afghanistan and Iraq campaigns
have challenged the Navy and its fellow military services to develop innovative
approaches to defeating the nation’s aggressive and highly adaptive enemies.
Members of our Strategic Research Department, among others, have been at the
forefront of analyzing the Iraqi insurgency and terrorist groups like al-Qa‘ida.
An international collaborative project on the new Proliferation Security Initiative has placed Newport in the lead for development of the U.S. and international community’s latest approaches for halting the transshipment of weapons
of mass destruction (WMD) and their materials. In 2004, the College designed,
executed, and analyzed a war game, held in Newport and attended by seventeen
nations, to test the capability of a multinational effort to collaborate operationally and legally so as to interdict the movement of WMD and related materials at
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sea. Also, as a result of the GWOT and the highly constrained nature of modern
warfare more generally, there is a greater appreciation of the importance of international law in shaping military operations. Our International Law Department is fully engaged in exploring the implications of this development,
especially ways of effectively disseminating the substance of operational international law to operational commanders.
Whether we are exploring the potential of Sea Power 21 or grappling with the
latest terrorist threat, we construe military research and analysis to be a continuum. Any problem has contained in it other problems at all the levels of military
operations: strategic, operational, tactical, and technical. As analysis proceeds
up and down those levels, different methods and organizations are brought into
play. Our comparative advantage is focusing largely, but not exclusively, on the
strategic and operational levels of military operations. But, obviously, it is important to be knowledgeable about tactical- and technical-level subjects so as to
make higher-level research, analysis, and gaming possible in the first place. We
do this by maintaining an outstanding faculty and student body and by partnering with other war-gaming and analysis activities in both the public and private
sectors. By reaching out to the fleet, to Joint Forces Command, the U.S. intelligence community, and various other agencies and departments, the Naval War
College leverages its own resources in an era defined by joint, interagency, and
multinational operations.
Following World War II, Fleet Admiral Chester Nimitz wrote, “The war with
Japan had been reenacted in the game rooms at the War College by so many
people, and in so many different ways, that nothing that happened during the
war was a surprise . . . absolutely nothing except the Kamikaze tactics towards the
end of the war—we had not visualized these.” I have always felt this was a
good-news/bad-news story. The good news is that we successfully prepared for
waging a deadly war across the Pacific. What our predecessors accomplished in
Pringle Hall and Sims Hall hastened victory and saved many lives. The bad news
is that something important was missed that slowed the final victory and cost
more lives than was necessary.
This is why we maintain a small exhibit dedicated to Fleet Admiral Nimitz,
centrally located in McCarty Little Hall, the Navy’s state-of-the-art facility
where we do our world-renowned research, analysis, and war gaming. We want
our people to remember every day as they come to work that thinking carefully
about future wars matters enormously. It has real consequences—good and bad.
We have to get it right. Our criterion of success is a set of insights into military
conflict of such scope, accuracy, and penetration that current and future leaders
can voice the same sentiments as those of Fleet Admiral Nimitz, now a half
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century ago. And when our students leave, they take with them to the fleet and
positions of extraordinary responsibility around the world not only the substance of these insights but the analytic and intellectual skills to create them.

J. L. SHUFORD

Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
President, Naval War College
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